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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

In a recent case, Matter of Bauer,212 the petitioners served
MVAIC with a notice of intention to arbitrate. Within 10 days
thereafter, MVAIC served notice that it would apply for an order
staying the arbitration. This notice was served on the petitioner's
attorney. The court found that such service was null. Since
the application to stay the arbitration was the first application to
a court arising out of this arbitrable controversy, it had to be
served in accordance with CPLR 403 or CPLR 7503. In other
words, since it was not merely a motion, but rather the commencement of a special proceeding, service had to be made in the
same manner as a summons or by registered mail or certified mail,
return receipt requested.
CPLR 7511: Arbitrator's award difficult to set aside.
Generally, an arbitrator's award is not reversible by a court for
errors of law or fact.2 13 CPLR 7511(b) provides grounds for
vacating an award where a party's rights have been prejudiced by
(1) corruption, fraud or misconduct, (2) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as neutral, or (3) where an arbitrator exceeded his
powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a final and definite
award was not made.
In Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd.,21 4 the
appellate division, first department, reversed an order vacating and
setting aside an arbitration award to a buyer of defective goods.
The amount of the award was in excess of four times the purchase
price of the goods shipped, notwithstanding that the contract purported to limit the amount of the buyer's damages to the difference
in value between the goods specified and the goods actually delivered. The court, in determining whether the arbitrator exceeded
25
his power under 7511(b), first examined the arbitration clause, 1
finding it to be a broad arbitration clause. The court then examined the clause which purported to limit damages and decided that
it would not be irrational for the arbitrator to find this clause un-

55 Misc. 2d 991, 287 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct Wyoming County 1968).
E.g., In re Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902); In re Colletti,
23 App. Div. 2d 245, 248, 260 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d
460, 213 N.E.2d 894, 266 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1965).
21429 App. Div. 2d 303, 287 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1st Dep't 1968).
2
15 "ARBITRATION.
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract shall be settled by arbitration." Id. at 305, 287 N.Y.S.
2d at 767. This is a broad arbitration clause. In New York, where there is
a broad arbitration clause, the rules of law which apply are those that the
arbitrator deems appropriate. It re Exercycle Corp., 9 N.Y.2d 329, 334, 174
N.F_.2d 463, 464, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1961).
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conscionable.21 ' It was reasoned that since the arbitrator had
authority to decide controversies over this -contract, -he had the
power to decide the conscionability of this clause and to declare
it ineffective. 217
The dissent stated that in spite of the broad powers of an
arbitrator it appeared that the arbitrator here'had clearly exceeded
his power by disregarding the terms of the contract.
The Granite case emphasizes that one who decides to agree to
arbitration is giving up the procedural and substantive law of the
State. 218 Therefore, the practitioner would do well to explain
these practical consequences to his client before arbitration is
agreed to.
The benefit of avoiding court delay by arbitration. may be
outweighed by an unexpected award which is difficult, if not impossible, to vacate.
ARTICLE 81 -
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CPLR 8101: Costs allowed on application to confirm
arbitrationaward.
CPLR 8101 provides that "[t]he party in whose favor a
judgment is entered is entitled to costs in the action, unless otherwise provided by statute or unless [in the court's discretion it is]
not equitable. ..

."

In a recent case, Terenzi v. Aetna Casuwty & Surety Co.,"1 9
an application to confirm an arbitration award arising out of an
uninsured automobile policy endorsement, was opposed solely with
respect to costs. The supreme court, New York County, held that
since the insurer had brought the proceeding to vacate the insured's demand for arbitration it would not be inequitable to
216 The court stated: "Of course, we do not know the bases for the
arbitrator's decision. But, considering the arguments presented here, and
at Special Term, it is quite clear that the arbitrator, in essence, did no
more than a court of law could do in the circumstances." 29 App. Div. 2d
at 306, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
21729 App. Div. 2d at 308, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 770 (dissenting opinion).
judge Steuer cited In re Cash Register Co., 8 N.Y.2d 377, 383, 171 N.E2d
302, 305, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951, 955 (1960), for the proposition that the arbitrator
cannot give a completely irrational construction to the contract. The majority
cited the same case and declared that it could not be said that the arbitrator,
in finding the clause unconscionable, was acting irrationally. 29 App. Div.
2d at 305-06, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
218See In re Staldinskd, 6 N.Y2d 159, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959), where
an arbitrator's award of specific performance was affirmed in a personal
services contract dispute.
219 56 Misc. 2d 177, 288 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968).

